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 ABSTRACT 
The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) element integrates all the subsystems needed for ascent 
flight, entry, and recovery of the combined Booster and Motor system.  These include the 
structures, avionics, thrust vector control, pyrotechnic, range safety, deceleration, thermal 
protection, and retrieval systems.  This represents the only human-rated, recoverable and 
refurbishable solid rocket ever developed and flown.   
Challenges included subsystem integration, thermal environments and severe loads (including 
water impact), sometimes resulting in hardware attrition.  Several of the subsystems evolved 
during the program through design changes.  These included the thermal protection system, 
range safety system, parachute/recovery system, and others.  Because the system was 
recovered, the SRB was ideal for data and imagery acquisition, which proved essential for 
understanding loads, environments and system response.   
The three main parachutes that lower the SRBs to the ocean are the largest parachutes ever 
designed, and the SRBs are the largest structures ever to be lowered by parachutes.  SRB 
recovery from the ocean was a unique process and represented a significant operational 
challenge; requiring personnel, facilities, transportation, and ground support equipment.  
The SRB element achieved reliability via extensive system testing and checkout, redundancy 
management, and a thorough postflight assessment process.  However, the in-flight data and 
postflight assessment process revealed the hardware was affected much more strongly than 
originally anticipated.  Assembly and integration of the booster subsystems required acceptance 
testing of reused hardware components for each build.  Extensive testing was done to assure 
hardware functionality at each level of stage integration.  Because the booster element is 
recoverable, subsystems were available for inspection and testing postflight, unique to the Shuttle 
launch vehicle.  Problems were noted and corrective actions were implemented as needed.  The 
postflight assessment process was quite detailed and a significant portion of flight operations.   
The SRBs provided fully redundant critical systems including thrust vector control, mission 
critical pyrotechnics, avionics, and parachute recovery system.  The design intent was to lift off 
with full redundancy.  On occasion, the redundancy management scheme was needed during 
flight operations.  This paper describes some of the design challenges and technical issues, how 
the design evolved with time, and key areas where hardware reusability contributed to improved 
system level understanding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nomenclature
APU = Auxiliary Power Unit 
BSM = Booster Separation Motor 
DAS = Data Acquisition System 
DFI = Developmental Flight 
Instrumentation 
EDAS = Enhanced Data Acquisition 
System 
ET = External Tank 
KSC = Kennedy Space Center 
MLP = Mobile Launch Platform 
MMT = Mission Management Team 
MRB = Material Review Board 
MSFC = Marshall Space Flight Center 
NASA = National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
APU = Auxiliary Power Unit 
NDE = Non-Destructive Evaluation 
NSI = NASA Standard Initiator 
OEM = Original Equipment 
Manufacturer 
STS = Space Transportation System 
TPS = Thermal Protection System 
TVC = Thrust Vector Control 
 
SRB-101 
The SRBs are the largest solid propellant rocket motors ever flown, and the first designed for 
reuse.  The two SRBs provide the main thrust to lift the Space Shuttle off the launch pad to an 
altitude of ~150,000 feet (28 miles) and burn for 123 seconds during ascent.  Each SRB is 149.16 
feet long, 12.17 feet in diameter and weighs ~1,300,000 pounds at launch.  During flight, each 
SRB burns ~1,100,000 pounds of propellant, with a final weight of ~192,000 pounds.  The flight 
sequence for the SRBs can be seen in Figure 1, from lift-off through retrieval. 
 
The primary elements/systems of the SRBs include the solid rocket motor (motor case, 
propellant, igniter and nozzle), forward and aft structures, separation systems, operational flight 
instrumentation, recovery avionics, pyrotechnics, deceleration system, thrust vector control 
system and range safety destruct system.  Each booster is attached to the External Tank (ET) at 
the SRBs aft frame by two lateral sway braces and a diagonal attachment (struts).  The forward 
end of each SRB is attached to the ET on a ball fitting on the SRBs forward skirt.  On the launch 
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Figure 1. SRB Flight Sequence 
 
 
pad, each booster is secured to the Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP) at the aft skirt by four bolts 
and frangible nuts which are severed by small explosives at lift-off.  In fact, the entire Space 
Shuttle system is attached to the MLP with these eight bolts!  The two SRBs carry the entire 
weight of the ET and Orbiter, and transmit the weight load (4,500,000 pounds) through their 
structure to the MLP.  
Each booster has a sea level thrust of ~2,800,000 pounds at launch (peaking to 3,300,000 
pounds).  The two SRBs provide ~83% of the lift-off thrust.  At 123 seconds/150,000 feet 
(technically when the propellant is consumed), a series of pyrotechnic events occur to disconnect 
the SRBs from the ET at the struts and forward attach point, followed by eight Booster Separation 
Motors per SRB igniting for a 0.8 second burn, providing 20,000 pounds of thrust each, and 
pushing the SRBs safely away from the ET and Orbiter. 
Seventy- five seconds after SRB separation, the SRBs reach apogee at an altitude of 
~220,000 feet (41 miles).  During decent through the Earth’s atmosphere, the SRBs 
aerodynamically bleed energy, slowing down sufficiently until the deceleration system initiates.  
The SRB deceleration sequence provides attitude and terminal velocity control of the SRB for 
water impact.  This system is located in the forward assembly of each SRB and is comprised of 
the drogue pilot assembly, main parachute cluster assembly and altitude switch assembly.  SRB 
water impact occurs in the ocean ~141 miles downrange.  The SRBs and parachutes are 
retrieved and towed back to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for reuse via recovery ships.  The 
retrieval process begins once splash down occurs (T+6.5 minutes) in the ocean and the ships 
approach each SRB for recovery operations.  At KSC, the SRBs are inspected, disassembled, 
refurbished, re-assembled, stacked and integrated with an ET and Orbiter, and the process 
begins anew (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. SRB Circle of Life. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
KEY SRB POSTFLIGHT/REFURBISHMENT FINDINGS AND CORRESPONDING LESSONS 
LEARNED  
Over the next few sections, this paper will provide insight into several of the significant design 
and/or process changes that were a direct result of SRB postflight/refurbishment findings.  These 
examples cover a wide array of deficiencies (manufacturing, workmanship, and design) that were 
unknown prior to flight and in many of the cases would not have been realized without inspection 
of the flown hardware.  In each case the program was able to take action to mitigate the risk of 
these issues adversely affecting the next launch vehicle.  This corrective action response would 
not have been possible if the SRBs were not recovered and assessed. 
POSTFLIGHT ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
Following each mission, the recovered boosters were brought back to Kennedy Space Center 
for a thorough inspection of how the environments affected the hardware.  The combination of 
flight environments (aeroheating, accelerations, vibration, etc.) with the recovery environments 
(water impact, sea-water immersion, etc.) left the hardware needing more processing than the 
anticipated “Wash, Dry and Fly” program goal. 
As a result of the postflight condition observed early on the in the Shuttle program, a reuse 
standard (SRB Refurbishment Specification, 10SPC-0131) was developed to define the 
inspection, testing and refurbishment criteria for each reusable part before such a part could be 
placed back into serviceable stock. 
The other consequences of the postflight assessment was improvements to design, 
processes, workmanship and in-flight data acquisition systems, all of which are detailed further in 
this paper. 
SRB CAMERA AND DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
The Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters were the first of their kind to be recovered and 
reused.  In order to support that design requirement, flight environments, performance and 
imagery data were acquired heavily during the onset of the program, and the flight hardware was 
refined and improved throughout the program.  Data systems were located on chase planes, 
boats and on-board the flight hardware.  They all played a key role for assessing the vehicle 
performance as well as providing a better understanding of the flight environments. 
For the first six Space Shuttle flights, a full set of Developmental Flight Instrumentation (DFI) 
data was acquired, measuring in-flight parameters such as temperatures, pressures, 
accelerations, strains and heating rates.  Thereafter, a limited set of data was acquired on several 
flights, until Return to Flight from the Challenger Accident, where we had three more flights of 
DFI.  Starting STS-72 (January 1996), an on-board Data Acquisition System (DAS) was installed 
which recorded accelerometer data within the forward skirt to assess splashdown loads at water 
impact.  An “enhanced” system (EDAS) was also used periodically from STS-91 (June 1998) to 
gather specific data for an area of interest  (i.e. thermocouples to assess Thermal Protection 
System removal, strain gages, accelerometers and/or force gages to validate analytical models, 
and most recently pressure and strain gages to assess SRB thrust oscillations).  With this data, 
the booster design could be continually examined, allowing analysis models to be further 
developed and refined to predict the hardware performance.   
In addition to data acquisition systems, in-flight imagery was acquired, starting with video from 
tracking ships as well as Air Force Starcast and Navy Castglance aircraft.  STS-41G (October 
1984) incorporated a 16mm camera to capture parachute deployment, and it was used 
periodically on subsequent flights.  Camcorders were implemented into the DAS system starting 
on STS-77 (May 1996).  A second flight camera was installed on STS-95 (October 1998), and 
utilized for five flights to observe External Tank (ET) foam performance on the Intertank (the 
region between the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks), and was permanently implemented 
on STS-114 (July 2005).  On STS-121 (July 2006), two more in-flight video cameras were added 
to the SRBs to evaluate ascent debris concerns, with one camera on the forward skirt of the 
SRBs looking aft, and another on the ET Attach Ring looking forward (Figure 3).  All of these 
 
 
cameras, in addition to the ground-based 
imagery, ET Feedline Camera and Orbiter 
imagery, were tools that provided the Mission 
Management Team (MMT) valuable data to 
assist in evaluating the on-orbit condition of the 
Orbiter.  In addition, the cameras provided 
details of in-flight anomalies, such as parachute 
failures (Figure 4) and material liberation that 
could strike the Orbiter (Figure 5). 
From chase planes and boats, to on-board 
digital systems, data acquisition has been a key 
tool for supporting assessment of vehicle 
performance and in-flight debris imagery.  Such 
data supports flight assessments, expands upon 
the understanding of flight environments (and 
their variability from flight-to-flight) and provides 
records of historical performance, which has led to improved hardware designs and processing.  
The systems used on the flight vehicle were classified as low criticality hardware, but they 
provided invaluable data throughout the program. 
 
 LOSS OF TURBINE WHEEL BLADE PORTIONS DURING OPERATION 
During disassembly of the SRB Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) balance assembly that flew on 
STS 61 (1994), portions of the turbine wheel blade tips were noted to be missing on 62, 2nd-
stage blades. (Figure 6) The missing blade tips exited the turbine wheel area through the exhaust 
housing, fortunately causing no significant damage to any other parts.   Due to the low mass of 
the missing blade tips, the turbine wheel balance was negligibly affected.  The turbine wheel 
blade damage was attributed to a machining feature which accelerated the known crack growth.  
A review of all manufacturing paper for this unit indicated that a groove had been machined into 
each second stage blade of the 
turbine wheel.  These grooves 
were accepted by the Original 
Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) on a Material Review 
Board (MRB) disposition in 
1985.  A material analysis has 
determined that the turbine 
blade damage was precipitated 
by this machining feature.  This 
feature introduced a stress 
riser which accelerated known 
crack growth.  This anomaly 
required that all of the OEM’s 
 
Figure 5. STS-116 In-Flight Anomaly of TPS 
Striking the Orbiter during SRB Separation. 
 
Figure 3. STS-114 (July 26, 2005) Views from 
SRB Forward and Aft Pointing Cameras. 
 
Figure 4. STS-122 Parachute Failure 
Observed With Parachute Forward Skirt 
Dome Camera. 
 
 
 Figure 6. Auxiliary Power Unit S/N 171 Turbine Wheel  
 
 
MRB activity be reviewed by representatives of NASA and the SRB Contractor to gain confidence 
in supplier dispositions in addition to insuring that no other manufacturing defects existed on flight 
hardware which could result in turbine wheel blade damage.  All turbine wheels NDE (dye 
penetrant) mapping was reverified in order to restore hardware integrity.  If this APU had not been 
recovered and assessed after flight this anomaly would not have been known and other units with 
similar defects could have potentially flown. 
. 
 
UNBURNED BOOSTER SEPARATION MOTOR PROPELLANT 
During postflight disassembly inspection of STS-100 forward Booster Separation Motors 
(BSMs), one motor exhibited an unusual amount of residual propellant (4-5 of the original 75 
pounds) (Figure 7).  All other forward (7) BSMs were in nominal postflight condition.  As a result 
of this observation, the postflight assessment process required the calling of a “Squawk” which is 
a means to document and assess off-nominal observations.  The Squawk was subsequently 
elevated to an Anomaly, and a formal investigation team (Anomaly Resolution Team) was formed 
to determine the cause and corrective action of the incident.  The combined team included 
members from Design Engineering, Materials & Processes, Quality Engineering and the BSM 
sub-vendor, among other subject matter experts on the design and handling of the BSMs.  
Hardware build-paper was reviewed, computer modeling was performed, propellant testing was 
completed, and other material compatibility testing was performed.  A fault tree was created to 
properly access the observation and determine the root cause.  The investigation determined the 
cause of the unburned propellant was due to the intrusion of 2 cups of water past the seals and 
into the motor case.  Detailed forensic investigation determined that the cover seal was not likely 
in its “normal” position prior to flight.  The moisture intrusion was concluded to have occurred at 
the launch pad during a heavy rain event 20 days prior to launch (Figure 8).  Long-term exposure 
of the moisture degraded the retained propellant, reducing the propellant burn rate and inhibiting 
ignition. 
 
The corrective action for this issue was to perform dimensional checks as well as 
pressurization and vacuum leak checks.  The intent of these checks was to verify the integrity of 
the seals.  Additional improvements to the processing of the BSMs included replacing o-ring 
grease with one that results in less swelling, defining tighter dimensional tolerances on the final 
configuration, enhancing the controls on chemical use around the seal and to provide access to 
the BSMs at the launch pad.  Without recovery and assessment this condition would not have 
been known and future water intrusion could have occurred potentially affecting multiple motors. 
 
STS-57 BROKEN FUEL PUMP SHAFT 
      During refurbishment of an SRB APU that flew on STS 57 (1993), a broken fuel pump shaft 
was discovered in the hydrazine fuel pump.  The break occurred about 0.7 inches from the 
 
 
Figure 7. STS-100 Forward booster 
Separation Motor (BSM) Residual 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. BSM Water Intrusion 
 
 
gearbox end of the shaft. (Figure 9)  Following flight during the GN2 spin portion of Thrust Vector 
Control (TVC) deservicing, technicians at KSC noticed significant alcohol leakage from the 
overboard drain.  The unit was immediately sent to the OEM for disassembly whereupon the 
sheared shaft was discovered 
following removal of the fuel 
pump. The fuel pump shaft 
failure was attributed to 
improper installation of a 
preload beam.  The purpose of 
the preload beam is to bias the 
bearings to the low pressure 
side of the pump.  Review of 
flight data indicates the 
anomaly fortunately occurred 
after SRB separation therefore 
not affecting ascent 
performance.  All four APU 
turbine speed traces tracked 
together and were nominal.  
Radiographic inspection of the 
fuel pump prior to disassembly identified an arc-shaped object lodged between the drive gear and 
the pumps inlet window (low pressure side).  The same x-ray identified a preload beam missing 
from the driven bearing on the pump load piston side (high pressure side).  A metallurgical 
analysis of the fractured shaft (15-5 ph steel) did not identify any material or chemical anomalies 
which could lead to a premature failure.  The fuel pump was disassembled and a preload beam 
was confirmed to be lodged between the drive gear and the inlet window which prevented fuel 
pump rotation.  The bearing preload beams and mating slots were dimensionally inspected and 
found to be within drawing specifications.  A preload beam migration test confirmed a pathway 
the beam could travel to arrive at the gear inlet window.  Although the beam must move upwards 
to arrive at the inlet core, the fluid has enough momentum to lift the preload beam and position it 
at the inlet window.  It was determined that the preload beam could not enter the gear tooth 
opening when the pump was running therefore it was concluded that the beam must have 
entered the gear teeth after SRB splash down.  The failure is believed to have occurred during 
fuel system decontamination.   
      Recurrence control was implemented to prevent a repeat of this failure in the future, including 
the addition of a caution note and a visual inspection during fuel pump assembly.  Radiographic 
inspection of all units in the field was necessary prior to flight to verify that this critical assembly 
did not exist, and the preload beam was properly installed.  
 
 
STS-97 NSI INITIATION FAILURE 
During postflight disassembly 
of STS-97 technicians were 
surprised to find an unexpended 
pyrotechnic device installed on 
an aft separation bolt utilized 
between the SRB and ET.  A 
NASA Standard Initiation (NSI) 
pressure cartridge located on the 
SRB side of the left lower strut 
on STS-97 failed to initiate at 
SRB separation (Figure 10). The 
aft separation bolts are designed 
to accommodate two NSIs for 
redundancy, but only one NSI 
functioned properly at the 
 
 
Figure 9. Fuel Pump S/N 152 Off Nominal Configuration 
 
Figure 10. Lower Strut 
 
 
aforementioned location. Electrical tests determined intermittent continuity, which varied with 
positioning, on the cable assembly at the NSI connector end. The entire cable assembly was x-
rayed where a defect was observed in the braided shield, but no damage of the two inner 
conductors could be visually ascertained from the x-rays. The subject cable assembly was then 
transferred for failure analysis.  Upon disassembly of the J2 connector, it was evident that the 
braided shield had been entirely broken, and both of the conductors were also completely 
fractured at the connector pin crimps. A microscopic examination of the wires composing the 
braided shield and the wires of both conductors revealed that the cable assembly failed as a 
result of tensile stress overload.  
While the failure was possibly caused by multiple tensile stress applications, there was no 
evidence to indicate that the failure was not caused by a single event. No manufacturing defects 
of the cable assembly were found. There was no evidence of electrical arcing inside either of the 
two pin barrels or on any of the wire strands. There was no evidence of fatigue, corrosion, or any 
other deleterious condition other than tensile stress overload.  Due to this critical failure the 
vehicle on the pad was rolled back to the Vertical Assembly Building for further interrogation.  
Several corrective actions were taken including radiographic inspection of all cables, flex tests 
prior to connection, and limiting use of reusable cables. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Shuttle program spanned over 30 years of flight with 135 missions consisting of 270 SRB 
flights.  Following each SRB flight the performance was evaluated utilizing telemetry, recorded 
data and flight hardware inspection to assess and improve the hardware when necessary.  With 
the number of years and flights the Shuttle endured it was unique relative to being 
programmatically viable to retrieve and reuse the hardware. 
Although the reusability of the SRB has been highly successful, it never fulfilled the program’s 
original goal of “wash, dry and fly”.  The primary structures and Line Replaceable Units were 
qualified to 40 and 20 missions respectively.  The qualification tests were done without 
disassembly between mission exposures.  That said, due to the harsh environments the Booster 
hardware was exposed to each flight, including highly variable water impact loads (driven by 
horizontal velocity, sea state, and slap-down loads) the necessity of performing a more 
comprehensive refurbishment was required for certification of each additional flight.   
Refurbishment included significant disassembly, inspection, reassembly and bench tests that 
defined the booster circle of life each mission flow.   
 
